Abstract. Gaussian elimination is used in special linear groups to solve the word problem. In this paper, we extend Gaussian elimination to unitary groups. These algorithms have an application in building a public-key cryptosystem, we demonstrate that.
Introduction
Gaussian elimination is a very old theme in computational mathematics. It was developed to solve linear simultaneous equations. The modern day matrix theoretic approach was developed by John von Neumann and the popular textbook version by Alan Turing. Gaussian elimination has many applications and is a very well known mathematical method. We will not elaborate on it any further, but will refer an interested reader to a nice article by Grcar [11] . The way we look at Gaussian elimination is: it gives us an algorithm to write any matrix of the general linear group, GL(d, K), of size d over a field K as the product of elementary matrices and a diagonal matrix with all ones except one entry, using elementary operations. That entry in the diagonal is the determinant of the matrix. There are many ways to look at this phenomena. One simple way is: one can write the matrix as a word in generators. So in the language of computational group theory the word problem in GL(d, K) has an efficient algorithm -Gaussian elimination.
We write this paper to say that one can have a very similar result with unitary groups as well. We define elementary matrices and elementary operations for unitary groups. These matrices and operations are similar to that of elementary transvections and elementary row-column operations for special linear groups. Using these elementary matrices and elementary operations, we solve the word problem in unitary groups in a way that is very similar to the general linear groups. Similar algorithms are being developed for other classical groups and will be presented elsewhere.
In this paper, we work with a different set of generators than that is usual in computational group theory. The usual generators are called the standard generators [14, Tables 1 & 2] . Our generators, we call them elementary matrices and are defined later, have their root in the root spaces in Lie theory [6, Sections 11.3, 14 .5] and have the disadvantage of being a larger set compared to that of the standard generators. However, standard generators being "multiplicative" in nature, depends on the primitive element of a finite field, works only for finite fields. On the other hand, our generators, work for arbitrary fields. Using standard generators, one needs to solve the discrete logarithm problem often. No such need arises in our case. In the current literature, the best row-column operations in unitary groups is by Costi [9] and implemented in Magma [3] by Costi and C. Schneider. Using their magma function ClassicalRewriteNatural, we show that our algorithm is much faster, see Figure 1 .
A need for row-column operations in classical groups was articulated by Seress [19, Page 677] in 1997. Computational group theory and in particular constructive recognition of classical groups have come a long way till then. We will not give a historical overview of this, an interested reader can find such an overview in the works of Brooksbank [5, Section 1.1], Leedham-Green and O'Brien [14, Section 1.3] and O'Brien [17] . Two recent works that are relevant to our work are Costi [9] and Ambrose et. al. [1] .
In this paper, we only deal with unitary groups defined by the Hermitian form β defined later. The Hermitian form for the even-order case works for all characteristic. However, in the odd-order case the 2 in the upper-left makes it useless in the even characteristic. One can change this 2 to a 1 in β, however, then one needs to compensate that by putting 1 2 in the generators. We tried, but were unable to extend our algorithm for the odd-order unitary group to even characteristic. For even-order unitary groups, the algorithm developed in this paper works for all characteristic. However, for the odd-order case only odd characteristic will be considered.
1.1. Notations. For the rest of the paper, let K be a quadratic extension of the field k.There is an automorphism of degree two involved with these extensions and will be denoted by σ : x →x. In the case of C : R, σ is the complex conjugation. In the case of a finite field F q 2 : F q , σ is the map x → x q . We fix a non-zero ε ∈ K withε = −ε. Then every x ∈ K is of the form x = a + εb. We denote K o = {x ∈ K |x = −x}. We also denote
. Two important examples of K : k pairs that we have in mind are C : R and F q 2 : F q .
The main result that we prove in this paper follows. The result is well known, however the algorithmic proof of the result is original. Moreover, this algorithm is of independent interest in other areas, for example, constructive recognition of classical groups.
Theorem A. For d ≥ 4, using elementary operations, one can write any matrix A in U(d, K), the unitary group of size d over K, as product of elementary matrices and a diagonal matrix. The diagonal matrix is of the following form:
where λλ −1 = det A and d = 2l.
•
where αᾱ = 1 and αλλ −1 = det A and d = 2l + 1.
Hereλ is the image of λ under the automorphism σ.
A trivial corollary (Theorem 6.1) of our algorithm is very similar to a result by Steinberg [20, §6.2] , where he describes the generators of a projective-unitary group over odd characteristic. Our work is somewhat similar in nature to the work of Cohen et. al. [8] , where the authors study generalized row-column operations in Chevalley groups. They did not study twisted groups.
We use the algorithm developed to construct a MOR cryptosystem in unitary groups and study its security. From the discussion in Section 6 of this paper it follows:
Theorem B. The security of the MOR cryptosystem over U(d, q
2 ) is equivalent to the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem in F q 2d .
Unitary Groups
One of the legendary works of Chevalley [7] is a way to construct groups over an arbitrary field from a complex simple Lie algebra. These groups are now called Chevalley groups in his honor. Steinberg [20] generalized Chevalley's idea and introduced twisted Chevalley groups. These groups are now called Steinberg groups. These groups can be constructed in those cases where the Dynkin diagram of the underlying simple Lie algebra has a non-trivial symmetry. In this paper we work with the twisted group of type 2 A l , i.e., unitary groups. Let K be a field with a non-trivial field automorphism σ of order 2 with fixed field k. Let V be a vector space of dimension d over K. We denote the image of α under σ byᾱ. Let β : V × V → K be a non-degenerate Hermitian form, i.e., bar-linear in the first coordinate and linear in the second coordinate satisfying β(x, y) = β(y, x). We fix a basis for V and slightly abuse the notation to denote the matrix of β by β. Thus β is a non-singular matrix satisfying β = Tβ .
Definition 2.1 (Unitary Group). The unitary group is:
The special unitary group SU(d, K) consists of matrices of U(d, K) of determinant 1.
In this paper we work with split (i.e., maximum Witt index) Hermitian form. Recall that characteristic of K is odd whenever d is odd. For the convenience of computations we index the basis by 1, . . . , l, −1, . . . , −l when d = 2l and by 0, 1, . . . , l, −1, . . . , −l when d = 2l + 1; where l > 1. We also fix the matrix β as follows:
Thus the unitary group obtained with respect to this form is called the split unitary group.
There are two important examples of this split unitary group and subsequently of our algorithm: the field of complex numbers C over reals R with σ the complex conjugation and the other, finite field F q 2 over F q with sigma being α → α q . It is known that in both the cases there is only one non-degenerate Hermitian form up to equivalence [12, Corollary 10.4] . Equivalent Hermitian forms gives rise to conjugate unitary groups. In the case of a finite field, a unitary group will be denoted by U(d, q 2 ) and special unitary group as SU(d, q 2 ). A word of caution: in the literature U(d, q 2 ), U(d, F q ) and U(d, q) are used interchangeably.
Elementary matrices and elementary operations in unitary groups
Solving the word problem in any group is of interest in computational group theory. In a special linear group, it can be easily solved using Gaussian elimination. However, for many groups, it is a very hard problem. In this paper we present a fast, cubic-time solution to the word problem in unitary groups.
Gaussian elimination in SL(d, K) uses elementary transvections as the elementary matrices and row-column operations as elementary operations. These elementary operations are multiplication by elementary matrices. The elementary matrices are of the form I + te i,j (t ∈ K), where e i,j is the matrix unit with 1 in the (i, j) th position and zero elsewhere. In the same spirit, one can define Chevalley-Steinberg generators for the unitary group [6, Section 14.5] as follows:
Row-Column operations for U(2l, K). Rephrasing the earlier definition in matrix format, we have three kind of elementary matrices.
E1: R TR−1
where R = I + te i,j ; i = j.
E2:
I R I where R is either te i,j −te j,i ; i < j or se i,i .
E3:
Let g = A B C D be a 2l × 2l matrix written in block form of size l × l. Note the effect of multiplying g by matrices from above.
 where R is either te i,j −te j,i ; i < j or se i,i .
E4:
Here e i is the row vector with 1 at i th place and zero elsewhere.
. . , F l ) are rows of length l. Furthermore α ∈ K. Note the effect of multiplication by elementary matrices from above is as follows:
For E4 we only write the equations that we need later.
• Let the matrix g has
3.5. Row-interchange matrices. We need certain row interchange matrices, multiplication with these matrices from left, interchanges i th row with −i th row for 1 ≤ i ≤ l. These are certain Weyl group elements. These matrices can be produced as follows: for s ∈ K o ,
Note that our row interchange multiplies one row by s and the other by −s −1 and then swaps them. This scalar multiplication of rows produce no problem for our cause.
Gaussian elimination in Unitary Group
Now we present the main result of this paper, two algorithms, one for even-order unitary groups and other for the odd-order unitary groups.
4.1. The algorithm for even-order unitary groups.
Step 1: Input: Matrix g = A B C D which belongs to U(2l, K).
which is one of the following kind: (1, 1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0) with number of 1s equal to m < l and C 1 is of the form
where C 11 is an m × m skew-Hermitian matrix.
Justification: Observe that the effect of ER1 and EC1 on A is the usual row-column operations on a l × l matrix. Thus we can reduce A to the diagonal form using classical Gaussian elimination algorithm and Corollary 5.2 makes sure that C has the required form.
Step 2: Input:
Justification: Observe the effect of ER3. It changes C 1 by C 1 + RA 1 . Using Lemma 5.5 we can make the matrix C 1 the zero matrix in the first case and C 11 the zero matrix in the second case. After that we make use of row-interchange matrices to interchange the rows so that we get zero matrix at the place of C 1 . If required use ER1 and EC1 to make A 1 a diagonal matrix, say A 2 . Lemma 5.4 ensures that D 1 becomes
Justification: Using Corollary 5.3 we see that the matrix B 2 has certain form. We can use ER2 to make the matrix B 2 a zero matrix because of Lemma 5.5.
4.2.
The Algorithm for odd-order unitary groups. Recall that for odd-order unitary groups characteristic of K is odd. The algorithm is as follows:
Step 1:
 of one of the following kind:
a: Matrix A 1 is a diagonal matrix diag(1, . . . , 1, λ) with λ = 0. b: Matrix A 1 is a diagonal matrix diag(1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0) with number of 1s equal to m and m < l. Justification: Using ER1 and EC1 we can do row and column operations on A and get the required form.
Justification:
Once we have A 1 in diagonal form we use ER4 to change X 1 and EC4 to change E 1 . In the first case these can be made 0, however in the second case we can only make first m entries zero. Then Lemma 5.6 makes sure that C 1 has the required form, call it C 2 .
Step 3: Input:
Output:
Justification: Observe the effect of ER3 and EC4. Then Lemma 5.5 ensures that C 3 is zero in the first case. In the second case, it only makes first m rows of C 3 zero. Thus we interchange remaining rows of C 3 with A 3 to get the desired result.
Step 4: Input:
Justification: In the first case we already have E 3 = 0 thus Lemma 5.8 gives the desired result. In the second case, if needed we use ER1 and EC1 on A 3 to make it a diagonal. Lemma 5.7 ensures that A 3 has the full rank. Furthermore, we can use ER4 and EC4 to make E 3 = 0. Then again Lemma 5.8 gives the required form.
Step Output:
Justification
Proof of Theorem A.
Proof. Let g ∈ U(d, K). Using the Gaussian elimination above we can reduce g to a matrix of the form diag(1, . . . , 1, λ, 1, . . . , 1,λ −1 ) when d = 2l and diag(α, 1 . . . , 1, λ, 1, . . . , 1,λ −1 ) when d = 2l + 1. We further note that row-column operations are multiplication by elementary matrices from left or right and each of these elementary matrices have determinant one. Thus we get the required result.
Asymptotic complexity is O(l 3 ).
In this section, we show that the asymptotic complexity of the algorithm that we developed is O(l 3 ). We count the number of field multiplications. We can break the algorithm into three parts. One, reduce A to a diagonal, then deal with C and then with D. It is easy to see that reducing A to the diagonal has complexity O(l 3 ) and dealing with C and D has complexity O(l 3 ). Row interchange has complexity O(l 2 ). In the odd-order case there is a complexity of O(l) to deal with X, Y, E and F . In all, the worst case complexity is O(l 3 ).
A few technical lemmas
To justify our algorithms we need few lemmas. Many of these lemmas could be known to an expert. However, we include them for the convenience of a reader.
Lemma 5.1. Let Y = diag(1, . . . , 1, λ, . . . , λ) of size l with number of 1s equal to m < l. Let X be a matrix such that Y X is skew-Hermitian then X is of the form
where X 11 is skew-Hermitian and so is λX 22 if λ = 0.
Proof. We observe that the matrix Y X = X 11 X 12 λX 21 λX 22 . The condition that Y X is skew-Hermitian implies X 11 (and X 22 if λ = 0) is skew-Hermitian and
(1) If A is a diagonal matrix diag(1, 1, . . . , 1, λ) with λ = 0 then the matrix C is of the form
(2) If A is a diagonal matrix diag(1, 1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0) with number of 1s equal to m < l then the matrix C is of the form C 11 0 C 21 C 22 where C 11 is an m × m skew-Hermitian.
Proof. We use the condition that g satisfies Tḡ βg = β. 
Proof. Yet again, we use the condition that g satisfies Tḡ βg = β and A = Proof. The proof is simple computation.
• Lemma 5.5. Let Y = diag(1, 1, . . . , 1,λ) be of size l where λ = 0 and X = (x ij ) be a matrix such that Y X is skew-Hermitian. Then X = (R 1 + R 2 + . . .)Y where each R m is of the form te i,j −te j,i with t ∈ K for some i < j or of the form se i,i with s ∈ K o for some i.
Proof. Since Y X is skew-Hermitian, the matrix X is of the following form (see Lemma 5.1):
X 21 x where X 11 is skew-Hermitian of size (l − 1) × (l − 1) and X 21 is a row of size l − 1 and X 12 = −λ TX 21 and x = λ x λ a scalar satisfyingλx ∈ K o . Clearly any such matrix is sum of the matrices of the form R m Y .
(1) If A = diag(1, . . . , 1, λ) and X = 0 then C is of the form
C 21 c with C 11 skew-
. . , 1, 0, . . . , 0) with number of 1s equal m < l and X has first m entries 0 then C is of the form C 11 0 * * with C 11 skew-Hermitian and X must be zero.
Proof. We use the equation Proof. We compute Tḡ βg = β and get 2 TX X = 0 and 2 TX Y + TĀ D = I. This gives the required result.
Proof.
Equating this with β we get the required result.
• + 1, K) where A = diag(1, . . . , 1, λ) 
Finite Unitary Groups
In the next section, we talk about cryptography. In cryptography, we need to deal explicitly with finite fields. In this context, when K = F q 2 , we prove a theorem similar in spirit to Steinberg [20, Section 6.2] . The proof is an obvious corollary to our algorithm. Theorem 6.1. Fix an element ζ which generates the cyclic group F × q 2 , the subgroup F 1 q 2 is generated by ζ 1 = ζ q−1 . We add following matrices to the respective set of elementary matrices:
Then the group U(d, q 2 ) is generated by elementary matrices and the matrices defined above.
Special Unitary group SU(d, q
2 ). In the case of SU(2l, q 2 ) a simple and straightforward enhancement of our algorithm reduces a matrix g ∈ SU(2l, q 2 ) to the identity matrix. Thus the word problem in SU(2l, q 2 ) is completely solved as with SL(d, q) using only elementary matrices; this is particularly useful for the MOR cryptosystem. An analysis of a MOR cryptosystem similar to the MOR cryptosystem over SL(d, q) [15] will be done in the next section.
For the reduction to identity, note that Theorem 1.1 reduces g to diag(1, . . . , 1, λ, 1 . . . , 1,λ −1 ). However, since det(g) = λλ −1 = 1, we have λ =λ and λ ∈ F × q . Now, for s = ελ whereε = −ε,
So if we add w l,−l (s)w l,−l (−ε) to the output of Theorem 1.1, we have the identity matrix. In the case of SU(2l + 1, q 2 ) we need to add an extra generator h(ζ 1 ) = diag(ζ 1 , 1, . . . , 1) where ζ 1 is a generator of F 1 q 2 . Now we can reduce an element of the form diag(α, 1 . . . , λ, 1, . . . ,λ −1 ) to diag (1, 1 . . . , λ, 1, . . . ,λ −1 ) by multiplying with the suitable power of h(ζ 1 ). Note that finding the suitable power involves solving a discrete logarithm problem. Then we use similar computations for even-order case to reduce diag (1, 1 . . . , λ, 1, . . . ,λ −1 ) to identity.
The MOR cryptosystem on unitary groups
Briefly speaking, the MOR cryptosystem is a simple and straightforward generalization of the classic ElGamal cryptosystem and was put forward by Paeng et. al. [18] . In a MOR cryptosystem one works with the automorphism group rather than the group itself. It provides an interesting change in perspective in public-key cryptography -from finite cyclic groups to finite non-abelian groups. The MOR cryptosystem was studied for the special linear group in details by Mahalanobis [15] . For many other classical groups, except the orthogonal groups, the analysis of a MOR cryptosystem remains almost the same. So we will remain brief in this paper and refer an interested reader to [15] . The description of the MOR cryptosystem is as follows:
. . , g s be a finite group. Let φ be a non-identity automorphism.
• Public-key:
is public.
• Private-key: The integer m is private.
Encryption:
To encrypt a plaintext M ∈ G, get an arbitrary integer r ∈ [1, |φ|] compute φ r and φ rm . The ciphertext is (φ r , φ rm (M)). Decryption: After receiving the ciphertext (φ r , φ rm (M)), the user knows the private key m. So she computes φ mr from φ r and then computes M.
To develop a MOR cryptosystem we need a thorough understanding of the automorphisms group of the group involved. The automorphisms of unitary groups are well described in the literature. We mention them briefly to facilitate further discussion. 7.1. Automorphism Group of Unitary Groups. First we define the similitude group. We need these groups to define diagonal automorphisms. Definition 7.1 (Unitary similitude group). The unitary similitude group is defined as:
Note that the multiplier µ defines a group homomorphism from GU(d, q 2 ) to F × q with kernel the unitary group.
Conjugation Automorphisms: The conjugation maps g → ngn −1 for n ∈ GU(d, q 2 ) are called conjugation automorphisms. Furthermore, they are composition of two types of automorphismsinner automorphisms given as conjugation by elements of U(d, q
2 ) and diagonal automorphisms given as conjugation by diagonals of GU(d, q 2 ). Central Automorphisms:
2 ) [12, Theorem 11.22], any χ is equivalent to a group homomorphism from U(d,
There are at most q + 1 such maps. Field Automorphisms: For any automorphism σ of the field F q 2 , replacing all entries of a matrix by their image under σ give us a field automorphism.
The following theorem, due to Dieudonné [10, Theorem 25] , describes all automorphisms:
Theorem 7.1. Let q be odd and d ≥ 4. Then any automorphism φ of the unitary group U(d, q 2 ) is written as c χ ιδσ where c χ is a central automorphism, ι is an inner automorphism, δ is a diagonal automorphism and σ is a field automorphism.
As we saw above there are three kind of automorphisms in an unitary group. One is conjugation automorphism, the others are central and field automorphisms. A central automorphism being multiplication by an element of the center, that is a field element. Exponentiation of that will be a discrete logarithm problem in F q . Similar is the case with a field automorphism. So the only choice for a better MOR cryptosystem is a conjugating automorphism.
Once, we have decided that the automorphism that we are going to use in the MOR cryptosystem will act by conjugation. Further analysis is straightforward and follows [15, Section 7] . Recall that we insisted that automorphisms in the MOR cryptosystem are presented as action on generators. In this case, the generators are elementary matrices and the group is a special unitary group of even-order. Other groups can be used and analyzed similarly. Note that two things can happen: one can find the conjugator element for the automorphism in use, finding the conjugator up to a scalar multiple is enough. Or one cannot find the conjugator in the automorphism.
In the first case, the discrete logarithm problem in the automorphism becomes a discrete logarithm problem in a matrix group. Assume that we found the conjugating matrix A up to a scalar multiple, where A ∈ GU(d, q 2 ). Now the discrete logarithm problem in φ becomes a discrete logarithm problem in A. One can show that by suitably choosing A, the discrete logarithm in A is embedded in the field F q 2d . This argument is presented in details [15, Section 7.1]. We will not repeat it here. In the next section (reduction of security), we show that one can find this conjugating element for unitary groups and this gives us a proof of Theorem B.
The success of any cryptosystem comes from a balance between speed and security. In this paper, we deal with both speed and security of the MOR cryptosystem briefly. For an implementation of the MOR cryptosystem, we need to compute power of an automorphism. The algorithm of our choice is the famous square-and-multiply algorithm. Since we do not use any special algorithm for squaring, squaring and multiplying is the same for us. So we talk about multiplying two automorphisms. We present the automorphisms as action on generators, i.e., φ(g i ) is a matrix for i = 1, 2, . . . , s. The first step of the algorithm is to find the word in generators from the matrix 1 . So now the automorphism is φ(g i ) = w i where each w i is a word in generators. Once that is done then composing with an automorphism is substituting each generator in the word by another word. This can be done fast. The challenging thing is to find the matrix corresponding to the word thus formed. This is not a hard problem, but can be both time and memory intensive. What is the best way to do it is still an open question! However, there are many shortcuts available. One being an obvious time-memory trade off, like storing matrices corresponding to a word in generators. The other being there are many trivial and non-trivial relations among these generators and moreover these generators are sparse matrices. One can use these properties in the implementation.
This problem, which is of independent interest in computational group theory and is the reason that we insist on automorphisms being presented as generators for the MOR cryptosystem. For more information, see [15, Section 8] .
7.2. Reduction of security. In this subsection, we show that for unitary groups, the security of the MOR cryptosystem is the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem in F q 2d . This is the same as saying that we can find the conjugating matrix up to a scalar multiple. Let φ be an automorphism that works by conjugation, i.e., φ = ι g for some g and we try to determine g.
Step 1: The automorphism φ is presented as action on generators. Thus φ(
This implies that we know εge i,−i g −1 and similarly εge −i,i g −1 for fixed s = ε. We first claim that we can determine N := gD where D is diagonal.
When
where G i is at −i th place. Multiplying this with g −1 gives us scalar multiple of 
Step 2: Now we compute In the case d = 2l + 1, the matrix D is almost a diagonal matrix except the first column. However while computing D −1 (e 12 − e −2,−1 )D we also get d For us, this paper is an interplay of finite (non-abelian) groups and public key cryptography. Computational group theory, in particular computations with quasi-simple groups have a long and distinguished history [2, 8, 13, 14, 16] . The interesting thing to us is, some of the questions that arise naturally when dealing with the MOR cryptosystem are interesting in its own right in computational group theory and are actively studied. The row-column operations that we developed is one example of that. In the row-column operations we developed, we used a different set of generators. These generators have a long history starting with Chevalley. In our knowledge, we are the first to use them in row-column operations in Unitary groups. Earlier works were mostly done using the standard generators. It seems that Chevalley generators might offer a paradigm shift in algorithms with quasisimple groups. In Magma, there is an implementation of row-column operations in unitary groups in a function ClassicalRewriteNatural. We compared that function with our algorithm in an actual implementation on even order unitary groups. To select parameters for our simulation, we followed Costi's work [9, Table 6 .2]. In one case, the characteristic of the field was fixed at 7 and the size of the matrix at 20, we varied the degree of the extension of the field from 4 to 34. We then picked at random elements from the GeneralUnitaryGroup and timed our algorithm. The final time was the average over one thousand repetitions. We did the same with the magma function using special unitary groups. Times of both these algorithms were tabulated and is presented in Figure 1 . In another case, we kept the field fixed at 7 10 and changed the size of the matrix. In all cases, the final time was the average of one thousand random repetitions. The timing was tabulated and presented in Figure 1 . It seems the our algorithm is much better than that of Costi's from all aspects.
